Keynote

Fools Rush In: A Mountain Dilemma

by Prof. Jack D. Ives, Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada.

Introduction

The overview I have prepared possibly places too much emphasis on the topic: glacial lake outburst flood (GLOF, in the current Himalayan argot; jökulhlaup [Icelandic], my preferred term). I will introduce briefly other topics, such as tourism and its impacts, and discrimination against ethnic mountain minorities, even crimes against humanity, although I assume that they will be amply enlarged upon during the process of this e-conference. I also expect to provide several rejoinders.

Jökulhlaup (GLOF): definition:

It is well to begin by defining what we mean by “GLOF”, the objective of our discussion. The Icelandic term simply means: glacier (jökull); leap (hlaup) – hence, glacier leap, the response of a glacier to the usually sudden discharge of a large body of water, generally from beneath the glacier front. The discharging flood is produced by melting ice or snow or accumulating rain water, usually all three, that has been ponded over time by the glacier in one, or more, of several ways. The volume and frequency of the discharge is usually related to the size (thickness) and relative imperviousness of the glacier. Water will also often accumulate between the front of a thinning and retreating glacier and its end moraines, formed when the glacier was more extensive, usually implying that the climate was colder, or that solid precipitation was greater than at present. In the Himalaya and Iceland, and many other glacierized regions, these end moraines usually, but not invariably, date from one of the maximum stands of the so-called Little Ice Age (AD 1500 to 1900).

Lakes impounded laterally to a glacier tongue, as in a tributary and unglacierized valley (ice-dammed lakes sensu stricto) or bodies of water that accumulated within or beneath the glacier, usually become smaller and drain more frequently during periods of glacier thinning and retreat. There are copious records of this from Iceland and many other regions. In this case global warming reduces the magnitude, even the entire incidence, of the jökulhlaup (an important Icelandic exception is Grimsvötn/Vatnajökull – see Björnsson, 1988, 2002; Roberts, 2005).

The term GLOF, as used within the present atmosphere of gross exaggeration, applies particularly to moraine-dammed lakes. However, a lake that forms by amalgamation of many small supra-glacial melt ponds may fall within this category: Imja Lake, in the Khumbu, Nepal, and probably Tsho Rolpa, Rolwaling, Nepal, which have been central to much on-going discussion, are prime examples.

We should bear in mind, therefore, that a warming trend will likely reduce the hazard pertaining to ice-dammed lakes while increasing that resulting from drainage of moraine-dammed lakes (there are other variations: e.g., ice-cored moraines damming lakes). Even so, many moraine-dammed lakes burst out only once. The process of drainage breaches the moraine dam thus reducing its capacity, entirely or partially, to allow additional water to subsequently accumulate behind it.

My personal involvement in jökulhlaup research

Iceland, 1952-54: student assistant in collecting data leading up to witnessing the 1954

Skeiðarárhlaup, Öræfi, Southeast Iceland.

Northern Labrador and Baffin Island: mapping field evidence for pre-historic glacial

lake drainage.

Nepal Himalaya: Coordinator of the United Nations University’s (UNU) mountain

research project, 1978-2000 (Co-directed with Bruno Messerli).

A significant part of the UNU mountain project in Nepal involved assessment and mapping of mountain hazards. The first area of detailed study was Kakani, close in to Kathmandu. The second area was the Khumbu. In 1985 Kienholz and co-workers produced a multi-coloured map, scale 1:50,000, depicting mountain hazards and it was concluded that the most serious hazard was that deriving from the potential catastrophic outbreak of glacial lakes (Zimmermann et al., 1986). Just as this phase of the research project was coming to a close, Dig Tsho suddenly discharged and washed away the small hydro installation that was nearing completion at Thame. Several local people lost their lives and all the bridges for some 40 km downstream were washed out. Vuichard and Zimmermann, graduate students on the original mapping project, returned to the Khumbu to undertake an immediate post-facto examination of the Dig Tsho incident (Vuichard and Zimmermann, 1987). At the same time, I noted many glacier lakes in the wider area from examination of NASA satellite imagery. Drs Bradford Washburn and Barry Bishop were also in the process of conducting a project that produced high resolution conventional air photographs as a preliminary for construction of the now famous National Geographic 1:50,000 scale contour map of the Mt Everest region. At the time the Nepalese government had classified the photographs as “secret”. Dr Washburn, however, managed to take home with him surreptitiously a full set. He shared several of the photographs with me as they clearly identified the 1985 extent of Imja Lake that I was able to compare with photographs (in my care) taken in 1956 by my close friend of McGill University graduate student days, the late Professor Fritz Müller. This demonstrated that Imja Lake had begun to form well after 1956. The finding prompted the re-focusing of a part of the UNU mountain project, specifically on Imja Lake (Hammond, 1988; Watanabe et al., 1994). Watanabe has since followed up this study to the present.

One immediate result of all this was that Dr Colin Rosser, then Director of ICIMOD, invited me to Kathmandu for the 1986 summer as Visiting Scholar to undertake a thorough assessment of the Dig Tsho disaster. This resulted in publication of ICIMOD Occasional Paper No. 5 (Ives, 1986). The report concluded with a series of recommendations that, I believe, were the first of their kind, however obvious, that related to the Nepal Himalaya: basically, I urged that a detailed study and mapping should be undertaken across the Nepal Himalaya so that hazardous zones could be identified and steps taken to mitigate the danger faced by people living downstream as well as infrastructure. I urged Dr Rosser to seize the opportunity, on behalf of ICIMOD, to take a lead role in this highly relevant applied research undertaking. Dr Rosser decided not to proceed. Similarly, while I had received considerable assistance from Dr Vic Galay and staff of the Water and Energy Commission, HM Government of Nepal, the government also chose to ignore our recommendations – at least for more than a decade. By the mid-1990s the situation had changed. Global warming and associated GLOF hazards had become a politically “hot” topic. ICIMOD, with UNEP, finally moved to take advantage of the rapidly changing circumstances and produced the first inventory of glaciers and glacial lakes for Nepal and Bhutan (Mool, et al. 2002, a, b – reviewed by Reynolds and Taylor, MRD 24[3]: 272-274, 2004).

Arun III and the World Bank

The growing concern about GLOF hazards became an essential element of the World Bank and the Nepal Government’s determination to begin construction on a mega-hydroelectricity project – Arun III. This is a major topic in itself and goes well beyond my present purpose. However, some aspects are introduced because I believe them central to the e-conference discourse. Nevertheless, much detail and controversial dispute is readily available in the standard literature (Gyawali, 2001; Gyawali and Dixit, 1997; Ives 2006: 134-141, 236-237; Ives and Messerli, 1989: 111-113, 139).

The potential threat of GLOFs arose as a possible impediment to an immediate start on construction for Arun III. The World Bank assembled in Paris in April 1995 a group of “experts” to discuss and advise upon the hazard potential of a number of glacial lakes that had been identified in the upper River Arun watershed above the proposed dam site. Experts from the World Bank, the Government of Nepal, the main GLOF consulting firm Reynolds Geo-Sciences Ltd. , and official observers from the governments of Japan and Germany, two of the main possible donors, were invited. In addition, two “outside and neutral” experts were invited to keep the party honest.

It may be of interest to participants of this e-conference to learn that everyone present concluded that the GLOF hazard to the construction site was minimal and could be easily averted after construction had begun. This provided the World Bank justification for an immediate start to construction. It should also be noted, however, that the discourse was strictly limited to the GLOF hazard. Under no circumstances could any other, especially negative, aspect of Arun III be introduced. On the second evening of the “expert meeting” and during a private dinner, Dr Hans Röthlisberger said to me that he thought the World Bank was especially fortunate that its two “outside and neutral” experts were honest as we both were opposed to Arun III on other grounds, although we were denied the opportunity to broaden the discourse. Nevertheless, just as I had been on the point of leaving my home, then in Davis, California, to drive to Sacramento airport to catch a plane to Paris the morning’s post arrived. It contained a manuscript for review sent me by Dr Teiji Watanabe. This described his latest research on Imja Lake. I took it to Paris with me to read on the plane. I felt that Teiji’s findings were relevant to the Paris discussion and introduced them over strong objections the final morning of the consultation – Imja Lake was not located within the Arun watershed and therefore irrelevant. To which I replied: but if a breakout of Imja Lake occurred causing loss of lives and infrastructure that would probably have a significant impact on the future of Arun III.

During the subsequent coffee break the German government official asked me for a copy of the manuscript. I explained that it was a privileged document, but I would make a copy available dependent on Dr Watanabe’s concurrence. He concurred. Subsequently I learned from a well-placed source (who must remain anonymous for obvious reasons, even more than a decade later) that the manuscript was a major reason for the German government withdrawing as a donor for Arun III, which similarly influenced Japan. Perhaps the main reasons for the collapse of Arun III, however, are those itemized by Dr Dipak Gyawali, and which are readily accessible in the standard literature (Gyawali, 2001; Gyawali and Dixit, 1997; Ives, 2006).

From this point, we can turn to further research by Watanabe and his colleagues on Imja Lake, and glacial lakes in Bhutan, and especially to Tsho Rolpa. For the latter, however, I will defer to Dr John Reynolds who has vastly more experience in the engineering deflection/mitigation of such hazards. I will move instead to the relatively recent media discussion on GLOFs in the context of Global Warming.

Meltdown in the Himalaya

The term “meltdown” appears to have originated with Fred Pearce and the New Scientist (Pearce, 2002: 44-48). He quotes John Reynolds as warning that:

. . . . the 21^st century could see hundreds of millions dead and tens of billions

of dollars in damage [from GLOFs].

I hope John will qualify, or comment on, this draconian statement in his subsequent contribution to our e-conference. On the basis of known facts I believe that it would be hard to defend such a statement. In my opinion, we have entered the world of “overkill”, comparable to the warnings by the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (and many others) that no accessible forest would remain in Nepal by the year 2000. It is now 2006 and there is probably more accessible forest in Nepal than when these inflammatory statements were published over a quarter century ago. But let us proceed. The Guardian and The Times, amongst other leading newspapers, have predicted that all the glaciers in the Himalaya will melt, these reports often based on information obtained from respected scholars. Furthermore, I have read that after the great meltdown and ensuing destructive floods, the Ganges would be reduced to a trickle and hundreds of millions would die from thirst (but surely, if global warming proves extensive enough to melt all the glaciers, will it not still rain – as distinct from snowing at high altitudes?).

Sets of satellite images have been reproduced to demonstrate that Kilimanjaro is losing its ice cap so rapidly that none will remain within a very few years. Yet these so-called replicated pairs of photographs were taken at different seasons: the first, post-monsoon, reflecting maximum snow cover; the second, pre-monsoon, showing minimum snow cover. Thus an illusion is presented to the inexperienced news media reader/observor with the intent of high drama – and deceit? Another example that is being increasingly used describes the crisis of total disappearance of glaciers from Glacier National Park, Montana, USA. It is stipulated that of nearly 40 glaciers within the park, more than half have already gone. Again, the inexperienced reader is misled. These numbers surely prove the extent of the disaster! Yet many of these “glaciers”, even 30 years ago, were so small that some glaciologists at that time argued that they were NOT glaciers but semi-permanent snow patches (this is a deliberately controversial commentary and is not intended to criticize the careful observations of Glacial National Park personnel). Let me introduce here, however, a somewhat similar group of ice-patches, permanent snow patches, and small glaciers with which I became very familiar some 30 years ago. Nel Caine, of the Department of Geography and INSTAAR, has kindly brought me up to date on the status of ice and snow in the Colorado Front Range. In the case of the Arikaree Glacier, the mass balance appears to have been close to zero from the 1960s until about 10 years ago. Since then it has been consistently negative with an accumulated loss of about 10 m w/e (about 1 m/yr). Half of this occurred in the two drought years of 2001 and 2002; 2002 is now rated as the “drought of record” for the State – i.e. the driest in over 100 years. Most of the mass loss appears to have been on the northern, more exposed part of the glacier. Caine reports an average surface lowering of 17 m between 1968 and 2004. All of this has had little effect on the area of the glacier – perhaps a reduction of about 5% since 1963. The Arapaho Glacier has experienced somewhat greater changes, but again related to solar exposure.

Nevertheless, on the basis of my somewhat “old fashioned” education, I would characterize some of the more dramatic statements introduced above, and they are only examples amongst many, as unfounded (the kindest interpretation) or downright dishonest. From the discussion so far, some of my readers may be tempted to put me into the category of non-believers of global warming (virtually akin to Holocaust deniers). I hope I can correct this by explaining, using a single example; I have been systematically photographing the glaciers of Öræfi, Southeast Iceland, for more than 50 years and have single-handedly accumulated a significant record of glacier thinning and retreat (other researchers have conducted more detailed glaciological studies in Öræfi than me). Nor am I remotely challenging the widely assumed contention that global warming is occurring and that it already has had a marked impact on the natural landscape. I am merely protesting the clamour for gross exaggeration.

How do we “save” Mt Everest from global warming?

In the autumn of 2004 I received a request from Peter Roderick, an English environmental lawyer, to join an appeal to UNESCO prepared by a group of very distinguished environmentalists and mountaineers to “save Mt Everest from global warming”. I asked if the appeal could be broadened to include objectives that probably could be attained on a relatively short-term basis. It proved inappropriate to modify the original text to such an extent. Because I felt this left such an appeal too amorphous for specific action I declined to sign it. A convivial discussion ensued, much of which was formalized for publication in Mountain Research and Development Volume 25(4): 394-398. Peter generously concluded his reply to the effect that “we’re coming from the same place.” This is correct. However, my suggestions had included the need for immediate action on several urgent and practical matters stemming from Alton Byers’s long-term research in the Khumbu and elsewhere (Byers, 2005): especially action to curtail damage to the upper treeline-alpine meadow belt resulting from severe impact by trekking tourists, mountaineers, and traditional local practices. Fortunately, Alton and several colleagues, including many local people, have attracted the funding attention of the American Alpine Club, the US National Science Foundation, and the National Geographic Society. This will begin the process of environmental and social action to correct the damage, not only in the Khumbu, but in the Peruvian Andes and other mountain regions. I raise this apparent contrast between short-term, well-defined objectives based upon sound scientific research and big picture altruism that appears to employ some of the excessively exaggerated reporting to which I have referred above. This issue might be deemed worthy of further discussion during our e-conference.

Social and Political Problems

We are all aware of the devastation that is being caused throughout many of the world’s mountain regions by warfare in all its forms. I use the term “warfare” in its broadest sense to include: full-scale conventional war; defensive military stand-offs; guerrilla activities; forced migrations and the growing number of both internal and external refugees; expropriation of land for major infrastructure or for the establishment of national parks; and pervasive discrimination against the poor, the under-privileged, and the politically marginalized. To blame mountain minorities for deforestation leading to severe downstream damage (even though not proven and unlikely) as excuse for widespread bans on tree-felling falls under my definition of “warfare”. In this sense the THED (Theory of Himalayan Environmental Degradation) some time ago promoted by major aid agencies and local governments can be regarded as a form of warfare directed against the poor mountain minorities.

This issue of warfare, however, is such a large topic that it probably exceeds the scope of this e-conference, although we may want to consider some aspects. Let me introduce one example.

One critical aspect, to my mind, is the plight of the more than 100,000 Lhotsampa (Bhutanese of Nepalese extraction) refugees currently in their 16^th year of deprivation encamped in eastern Nepal. The case is important for many reasons, the humanitarian one, of course, being pre-eminent. Nevertheless, for our present discussion I want to highlight several associated issues. In my estimation, we may be dealing with a case of “crimes against humanity” perpetuated by the very government (monarchical oligarchy) that publicly prides itself on its Buddhist tenets of peace and humanity symbolized in the King’s claimed adherence to “Gross National Happiness”.

In effect, the plight of the Lhotsampas is exacerbated by the news media. Not only is Bhutan perceived as the ideal Himalayan kingdom (a latter-day Shangri-la), but its government’s propaganda has effectively nourished this widespread “western” naivety such that the refugees receive little popular support. For instance, I have made repeated attempts to provide a number of newspapers with a more balanced account as response to reports on the beauty and tranquillity of Bhutan. All have been ignored. Moreover, the attempts that Seth and I made to develop a discussion of the issue via the Mountain Forum e-network were rebuffed as politically too sensitive. Are we not dealing here with a form of “soft” censorship?

Recent report from Kathmandu newspapers indicate that a “solution” is in sight – the United States has agreed to resettle 60,000 of the refugees; other industrialized countries have agreed to take in smaller numbers. Yet this appears to have produced disputes in the camps. Several of the camp leaders are reported to have objected to the “solution” wishing to resist the offers and hold out for full repatriation. Many of the long-suffering refugees appear to prefer immediate relief. If the plan for extensive resettlement to third countries proceeds, does this mean that Bhutan’s deliberate policy of forced migration of many of its largest minority (the Lhotsampa are perhaps half of the total population of Bhutan) is rewarded? Will this not appear as a case where possible “crimes against humanity” are informally sanctioned as politically expedient? Or is the implication raised here far too harsh? Have we the fortitude to discuss this tragedy? Can we invite commentaries from all sides of the issue, including from the refugee camps themselves? For a thorough treatment of the Lhotsampa “problem” see Michael Hutt, Unbecoming Citizens: Culture, Nationhood, and the Flight of the Refugees from Bhutan (Oxford U Press, 2003).

In this overview/introduction I have apparently emphasized two major topics that may seem very far apart. I have moved from glacier meltdown to entirely human meltdown. Perhaps there is a strong enough link. It is worth considering that politics can have consequences that rival, or far outweigh natural disasters. At least both sets of tragedies have potential for impacts far beyond their points of origin. Finally, one connecting factor is that both are permeated with misreporting by the news media, if not deliberate misinformation.

Tourism and its Impacts

I will do no more than introduce this important topic and leave it for enlargement by the contributors to the e-conference. I am sure many of us began with high hopes about how tourism, if properly managed, could greatly benefit the people and landscape of the mountain tourism destinations. I am equally sure that many of us have had severe disappointments. Seth and I, and others, have been extensively involved in the Lijiang area of northwestern Yunnan where our initial high hopes were dashed, in part by inter-departmental rivalries within funding agencies, but more especially by centralized governmental agencies determined to maximize profits rather than work toward ensuring that the poorer local people were able to benefit from real opportunities to achieve an “appropriate” tourism. What is “appropriate” might well be taken up as a topic for exploration.

Conclusion

In reading through what I have written I find that I have presented a pessimistic picture, despite maintaining that I am an inveterate optimist. Nevertheless, there have been many positive developments over the last twenty years. Perhaps we should try to catalogue these and discuss why some projects have been successes while others have merely led me, at least, to feel the need to quote the now somewhat ancient statement from The Times:

a definition of foreign aid – a process whereby the poor people of the rich

countries give money to the rich people of the poor countries.

I should also point out that many of the remarks I have made have been deliberately construed to be provocative, so the proverbial “pinch of salt” may be needed.

In any event, Chapters 6, 7, 8, and 10 in Himalayan Perceptions (2^nd edition, Himalayan Association for the Advancement of Science, Kathmandu, July 2006) might be worth reading, but especially Chapter 10.

Jack D. Ives, Ottawa, Canada, 24^th October, 2006.

e-mail: < jackives@pigeon.carleton.ca >

References

Björnsson, H. (1988): Hydrology of Ice Caps in Volcanic Regions, Societas Scientarium,

Islandica, Reykjavik.

Björnsson, H. (2002): Subglacial Lakes and Jökulhlaups in Iceland, Global and Planetary

Change, 35: 225-271.

Byers, A.C. (2005): Contemporary and Human Impacts on Alpine Landscapes in the

Sagarmatha (Mt Everest) National Park, Khumbu, Nepal, Annals

Association American Geographers, 95(1): 112-140.

Gyawali, D. (2001): Water in Nepal, Kathmandu: Himal Books.

Gyawali, D. and Dixit, A. (1997): How Distant is Nepali Science from Nepali Society?

Lessons from the 1997 Tsho Rolpa GLOF Panic, Water Nepal, 5(2): 5-43.

Hammond, J.E. (1988): Glacial Lakes in the Khumbu Region, Nepal. An assessment of

the hazards, unpublished Master’s thesis, Department of Geography,

University of Colorado, Boulder.

Hutt, M. (2003): Unbecoming Citizens: Culture, Nationahood, and the Flight of the

Refugees from Bhutan, Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Ives, J.D. (1986): Glacial Lake Outburst Floods and Risk Engineering in the Himalaya,

Occasional Paper No. 5, ICIMOD, Kathmandu.

Ives, J.D. (2006): Himalayan Perceptions: Environmental Change and the Well-being of

Mountain Peoples, 2^nd Edition, Kathmandu: Himalayan Assoc. for the

Advancement of Science.

Ives, J.D. and Messerli, B. (1989): The Himalayan Dilemma: Reconciling Development

and Conservation, London and New York: Routledge.

Mool, P.K. et al. (2001a): Inventory of Glaciers, Glacial Lakes and Glacial Lake

Outburst Floods, Nepal, ICIMOD: Kathmandu.

Mool, P.K. et al. (2001b): Inventory of Glaciers, Glacial Lakes and Glacial Lake

Outburst Floods, Bhutan, ICIMOD: Kathmandu.

Pearce, F. (2002): Meltdown, New Scientist, 2 November, 176 (2367): 44-48.

Reynolds, J.M. and Taylor, P.J. (2004): Book Review, Mountain Research and

Development, 24(3): 272-274.

Vuichard, D. and Zimmermann, M. (1987): The catastrophic drainage of a moraine-

dammed lake, Khumbu Himal, Nepal: Cause and consequences, Mountain

Research and Development, 7(2): 91-110.

Watanabe, T., Ives, J.D. and Hammond, J.E. (1994): Rapid growth of a glacial lake in

Khumbu Himal, Nepal: Prospects for a catastrophic flood, Mountain

Research and Development, 14(4): 329-340.

Zimmermann, M., Bichsel, M. and Kienholz, H. (1986): Mountain hazards mapping in

the Khumbu Himal, Nepal, Mountain Research and Development, 6(1):29-40.

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