Mountain Hazards, Mountain Tourism
November 7 - December 7 Online e-Conference

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Discussion Points derived from Reynolds' Paper

Kumar P. Mainali, e-conference moderator

Here is a laundry list of discussion points drawn from John Reynolds' provocative paper. Please weigh in with your responses!

1. Terminology: Jokulhlaup refers to the "leaping" of a glacier due to the lift of subglacial water which has reached a critical pressure due to sustained accumulation or geothermal melting. It should not be applied to the sort of event typical of the Himalayas, which involve sudden breaking of ice and or moraine dams.

2. In the case of Tsho Rolpa, response to local pleas for help took years. The government of Nepal got involved more than ten years after the alarm had first been raised, and only after "donor organizations" had taken the lead.

3. "Political" problems introduced significant and persistent inefficiencies. The embroiled agencies included the Water and Energy Commission Secretariat, Department of Hydrology and Meteorology, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ICIMOD, the Dutch, and the Japanese. The fact that the entire project did not die was due only to the fortuitous and unremunerated persistence of a private consultant. In other words, the procedures for dealing with the problem were inadequate, and the INGOs and national agencies were unable to collaborate effectively.

4. "Political" considerations led to reduction of the scope of the mitigation project recommended by scientist and also to rejection of an integrated management plan that would have provided benefits for the local populace and also sustained maintenance of the infrastructure. Unfortunately, Reynolds does not state unequivocally who did (or didn't) do what why. What is clear is that the vaunted "fix" at Tsho Rolpa has not adequately mitigated the GLOF hazard and has not provided ancillary benefits for the local people.

5. The media frenzy surrounding GLOF predictions in 1997 was largely due to the political disharmony alluded to above, with disgruntled experts providing tendentious commentary to the press. The absence of an "organization with the authority and scientific gravitas" to put a lid on the situation at that time was partially due to the lack of hard data; however, despite the fact that much more is now known, we still lack such an authoritative agency, and the media still promotes and exploits doomsday scenarios.

6. The Tsho Rolpa GLOF mitigation project lowered the lake water level by about one-fifth of the amount recommended. The condition of the overhanging glaciers and of the ice-cored moraine, both of which are known to be unstable, has not been monitored. The situation therefore must be considered dangerous.

7. The Arun III project nearly went forward on the basis of slipshod hazard assessments. Specifically, no glacial hazards were studied because old maps were used, and these maps showed no glacier lakes. A belated study was derailed by largely irrelevant data from a neighboring valley which raised the spectre of disastrous publicity -- not of an actual disaster. There may have been other reasons to oppose the project, but the fact is that a decision of great economic importance to Nepal was made on the basis of an irrelevancy.

8. As Jack Ives has argued, Reynolds states that there is no basis for the claim that glacial hazards put millions of people and billions of dollars at risk.

9. Predictions of disaster can be disastrous for tourism. The erroneous prediction of an event at Huaraz, Peru, led to $20 million in losses, and the offending press release remains accessible on the NASA Web site.

10. ICIMOD's list of dangerous glacial lakes in Nepal and Bhutan is not based on reliable data, and characterizations of Imja Tsho, in particular, misrepresent the hazard.

11. Recent work by Reynolds has resulted in a Multi-Criteria Analysis protocol for the assessment of glacial hazard; this has been accepted by the Union Commission for the Cryospheric Sciences and should be applied uniformly in all GLOF hazard determinations.

12. We now have the technical ability to assess GLOF hazards throughout the Himalayan region.

13. Emotive and subjective views are not acceptable and should be exposed for what they are. However, Reynolds believes that it will take another large disaster before the complacent donor community is moved to upgrade assessment procedures.

14. Tsho Rolpa remains a hazard. Funding is needed to reassess the situation around the lake and also to implement a remote sensing monitoring program for the larger catchment. Without reliable information, we face the Scylla and Charybdis of panic (induced by yellow journalism) and insouciance (induced by complacent authorities).

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